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Abstract
Work impairment is an increasing concern in advanced economies, particularly among young 
people. Activation, rather than passively providing economic support, is often regarded as the 
preferred strategy for addressing this issue. However, little is known about which measures 
are effective for improving youth work impairment. A hazard rate competing risk model with 
unobserved heterogeneity applied to rich Norwegian panel data provides some insights. Wage 
subsidies, and to some extent education/training programs, have the intended effect. In other 
words, work-impaired youths who participate in these measures have a higher probability of 
obtaining work/starting an education and a lower probability of experiencing a transition to 
social security than those youths who do not participate in any measure. The impacts of follow-up 
initiatives and work practice programs are more mixed.
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1 Introduction
Young people with health problems face several challenges in the labor market. They have 
a disadvantage in completing upper secondary school (Champaloux and Young, 2015) and 
getting a job (Maslow et al., 2011), and health problems might also affect their pay (Smith, 
2009). In addition, there are indications that poor health in adolescence has negative long-term 
consequences for employment, especially among people with low education (Holland et al., 
2011). Vocational rehabilitation programs (VRPs) have the purpose of facilitating labor market 
inclusion and counteracting the likelihood of labor market exclusion of people with reduced 
work capabilities. Moreover, the design and efficiency of public policies and the way program 
gatekeepers interpret the numerous policies available to them, affect the flows in and out of 
disability pensions (Burkhauser et al., 2016).
This article investigates the impact of VRPs targeting work-impaired youths in Norway. 
Norway serves an interesting case. The proportion of young people aged 18–29 years receiving 
health-related benefits in Norway increased from 1.9% in 1994, when unemployment reached 
its highest peak of the last decades, to 3.4% in 2000, and then further to 5.1% in 2017 (NOU, 
2019:7). The majority of these youths are diagnosed with mental health problems. Combined 
with a low exit rate from long-term sickness/disability to work, this trend is worrying. In addi-
tion, Norway, together with the other Scandinavian countries, has a long tradition of publicly 
supplied welfare services and activation measures. Existing evidence points to a shift in sick-
ness and disability policies in recent decades in most Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries from passive income support to stronger employment 
support and benefit conditionality (Böheim and Leoni, 2018). In Norway, individuals must 
attempt a VRP before they can be awarded a permanent disability claim. VRPs are much more 
comprehensive than ordinary active labor market programs (ALMP) for the unemployed, both 
in terms of their cost per capita and the number of participants.
There is a vast amount of literature on the impact of ordinary ALMPs. Fewer studies focus 
on VRPs (ALMPs for individuals with work impairment), and surprisingly few concentrate 
specifically on the impact of VRPs for young people. Existing evidence on ALMPs indicates 
that policies need to be targeted to be effective; there is a need to understand better what works 
for whom (Crépon and Berg, 2016). From the literature on ALMPs for ordinary unemployed 
individuals, it is clear that the effectiveness of programs differs substantially by age group, 
where young people seem to gain less from participation in ALMPs than adults do (Card et al., 
2017; Hardoy et al., 2018; Kluve et al., 2019).
The empirical literature on the impact of programs targeting people with reduced work 
capability using well-established identification strategies is scant and inconclusive. Some stud-
ies using more recent data deserve special mention. Angelov and Eliason (2018) study the effect 
of wage subsidies targeting job seekers with disabilities in Sweden and find both positive and 
negative impacts. Any positive employment effects seem to be outweighed by considerable 
lock-in effects. However, the participants are less likely to have a transition out of the labor 
force to the disability insurance program. Rehwald et al. (2018)’s Danish evidence from a ran-
domized experiment indicates that neither vocational programs nor counseling help sick-listed 
workers return to work, and they might even have adverse effects. These results are in contrast 
to those of Holm et al. (2017), who find positive employment effects of ordinary education and 
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wage subsidies for the same group of workers in Denmark. Campolieti et al. (2014) study the 
effects of a vocational rehabilitation program implemented in the late 90s in Canada. Their 
matching estimators suggest relatively small and imprecise effects for men and larger and sig-
nificant effects for women. Dean et al. (2017) apply a structural model to a rich U.S. sample 
from 2000 and find positive long-term effects on employment and earnings for individuals 
with mental health problems, particularly for employment-related services. Adamecz-Völgyi 
et al. (2018) in Hungary and Bewley et al. (2007) in the United Kingdom are examples of stud-
ies of comprehensive programs involving counseling, training, rehabilitation, and employment 
subsidies, which show positive employment effects.1 A randomized control trial (Burns et al., 
2007) carried out in six European countries among people with severe mental illness compares 
traditional vocational rehabilitation with individual placement and support, concluding that 
the latter is more effective. None of the abovementioned studies focus on youth.
A recent study focusing on work-impaired individuals in Norway with reduced work 
capabilities deserves closer mention. Markussen and Røed (2014) use local/geographical varia-
tion in labor market offices to identify the causal effects of VRPs on labor market outcomes. 
They conclude that strategies focusing on early intervention and participation in measures in 
the ordinary labor market are better than alternative strategies that give priority to vocational 
education or organized work in the sheltered sector. While older individuals benefit more 
from work-related measures, ordinary education seems to be the most successful measure for 
younger work-impaired individuals.2
In this study, we compare the impact of activation to that of passively receiving welfare 
support. We investigate how the duration of work impairment and eventual participation in 
the different VRPs affect transitions to one of two outcome states: job/education and social 
security. To identify the impact of VRPs, we use a mixed proportional competing risk hazard 
model (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003), which is described in detail in Gaure et al. (2007). A 
special feature of the model is that it captures unobserved heterogeneity, which is crucial for 
separating selection effects from causal effects.
Caliendo and Schmidl (2016) show that there is still no consensus regarding the effec-
tiveness of different active labor market policies for youth in Europe. They emphasize that 
more evidence is required and that there is a particular need for studies including education 
as an outcome of success as well as studies with a long observation period. Our study adds 
to the literature by providing causal evidence of the effect of such policies for a particularly 
vulnerable group—work-impaired youth—using comprehensive administrative data cover-
ing 12 birth cohorts over a period of 13 years and including several dimensions of outcome 
measures.
Our analyses indicate that wage subsidies primarily, but also to some extent education/
training programs, increase the probability of obtaining work/starting an education and reduce 
the probability of experiencing a transition to social security. The impacts of follow-up initia-
tives and work practice programs are more mixed. During participation, these measures are 
1 Positive results of VRPs are also found for Finland (Leinonen et al., 2019) and Switzerland (Hagen, 2019).
2 Salvanes et al. (2018) study the effects of ordinary education for young people with work impairment in Norway. They 
use a reform aimed at depriving work-impaired youths aged 22–25 years of the right to participate in ordinary education 
as a VRP. The analysis shows that the reform led to young people having more difficulties returning to work compared 
with young people who were not affected by the reform. However, the effect does not seem to be long-lasting.
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associated with an increased probability of having a transition to job/education. After program 
completion, the positive effect on job/education transitions persists. However, now the youths 
also have a higher probability of experiencing a transition to social security. We interpret this 
as an indication that follow-up and work practice measures are used as a screening device and 
function as springboards to working life.
The article proceeds as follows: first, we present the data, provide some descriptive statis-
tics, and describe the empirical model. Next, we look into the results on the impact of differ-
ent VRPs on job/education on the one hand and social security on the other. We conclude the 
article with a discussion of our results and a brief summary.
2 Data and sampling
We have access to rich Norwegian administrative data from several individual registers 
covering information on employment, unemployment, income, education, social welfare, 
demographics, administered and merged by Statistics Norway. Our sample consists of all 
residents in Norway born between 1976 and 1994 registering as work impaired for at least 
1 month during the period from January 2002 through December 2012, and who are between 
18 and 29 years old at the time of registration. Notice that the eldest we observe were 26 years 
old in 2002, and it is only in 2005 that we first observe youths up to age 29. The data has a panel 
structure, making it possible to follow individuals over time and monitor their transitions in 
and out of the labor market.
There are two possible ways to obtain the status of work impaired in the administra-
tive registers. One is after a period of employment and sick leave and requires a certificate 
of ill health issued by a general practitioner (GP). The other is to be given the status of work 
impaired by a supervisor at the Labour and Welfare Service (NAV) office3 through a work 
capacity assessment. There is no lower limit on the degree of reduced working capacity. The 
work capacity assessment is the basis for further follow-up and labor market measures. VRPs 
consist of measures targeting individuals with work impairment (e.g., vocational education 
and work in sheltered firms4) as well as ordinary active labor market programs (e.g., training 
and work practice). While being registered as having work impairment, youths may receive dif-
ferent kinds of benefits, depending on their health status. Youths who have their work capacity 
reduced by at least 50% due to a GP-certified illness are entitled to a health-related benefit.5 
Those who do not fulfill the health requirements may be eligible for unemployment benefits, 
activity support, or means-tested social assistance.
The unit of analysis is spells rather than individuals. A fresh spell of work impairment is 
defined as a period with no occurrence of registered work impairment during the previous 6 
months. The final sample consists of 130,634 unique spells beginning in the period 2002–2012, 
comprising 108,134 youths aged 18–29 years. We follow these youths on a monthly basis until 
3 NAV is all-encompassing in the sense that it provides all welfare services: social-, health- and labor market-related 
services. 
4 Sheltered firms produce goods and/or services and are established to provide clarification, job training, or qualification 
to persons who have reduced their ability to work. They are financed with public resources
5 Before 2010, the temporary health-related benefits consisted of rehabilitation benefits, vocational benefits, and time-
limited disability benefits. In 2010, these three benefits were merged into one benefit: the work assessment allowance. 
If work capacity is reduced permanently, permanent disability benefits may be granted. We remove youths who receive 
permanent disability benefits from our sample, as they are not likely to return to the labor market.
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December 2014, which means that we observe all youth for a minimum of 2 years and some 
youths up to 13 years.
While youths are registered with reduced working capacity, they can participate in VRPs. 
Transitions to VRPs are referred to as temporary transitions. It is not uncommon to have sev-
eral spells of program participation within the same spell of work impairment. However, it is 
problematic to model such repeated spells because previous participation in a labor market 
program can affect both the likelihood of future program participation and the impact of these 
programs. Therefore, in this study, we focus on the effect of the first VRP and censor subse-
quent transitions to VRPs.
VRPs vary throughout analysis based on economic fluctuations and labor demand.6 
Programs are grouped in such a way that they resemble the categories typically used in inter-
national studies (Kluve, 2010; Card et al., 2017). We focus on four major categories. Education/
training (EDU) refers to off-the-job classroom courses/education. Wage subsidies (WS) entail 
subsidized ordinary employment in the public or private sectors. Work practice (WP) is mostly 
on-the-job training expected to provide work experience in both the ordinary and sheltered 
sectors. Follow-up (FU) is supported by employment and follow-up assistance to obtain or 
retain work. The remaining small-scale programs are placed in a residual category, and transi-
tions to these programs are censored. A more detailed description of the different programs is 
found in Appendix B.
We distinguish between the effects of VRPs while participating in a program and the 
effects after completion of the program. A large body of research literature points to so-called 
lock-in effects, where the unemployed get locked into the program and spend less time search-
ing for jobs during their participation (van Ours, 2004; Røed and Raaum, 2006). After program 
completion, the likelihood of getting a job may increase again, for example, due to higher job 
search activity, increased formal or job-specific human capital, better information or larger net-
works. The work-impairment spell ends when the person is no longer registered with reduced 
working capacity for three consecutive months. We identify two exit states: exit to social secu-
rity, which includes a permanent disability or social assistance, and exit to an ordinary job or a 
formal education. Appendix B describes of the definition and priority of different labor market 
states. Transitions to states other than social security or job/education are censored.7 In addi-
tion, we censor spells that are still on-going at the end of the observation period.8 This makes it 
possible to include all young people who register as work impaired without having to assume 
when the spell will end.
2.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows the inflow into new spells of work impairment in our data by the month of 
entry. There was an increase in new work-impairment spells from 2002 to 2012, particularly 
in the periods 2002–2004 and 2009–2010. After 2010, the inflow into work impairment 
6 The target group has also been redefined in 2009/2010, and there have been changes in regulations, both of which have 
affected the composition of the target group and the way they are distributed in the different programs. The changes are 
discussed in depth in Sections 2.1 and 4.2.
7 Appendix B describes the definition and priority of different labor market states.
8 We also censor durations over 60 months, as transitions after this time are rare and complicate statistical inference.
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decreased. The observed pattern is mainly due to changing business cycles, with recessions 
in 2001–2003 and 2008–2009 causing increased inflows into nonemployment. However, 
changes in regulations related to the follow-up of individuals with work impairment may 
also have affected the inflows. First, the time-limited disability benefit was introduced 
in 2004. This was a temporary disability benefit targeted at young people with favorable 
labor market prospects, to decrease inflows into permanent disability pension. Then, a new 
follow-up work-impaired regime was introduced during 2009–2010. It involved a work-
capability assessment, along with an expansion of the eligibility criterion for receiving 
temporary health-related benefits to include individuals without previous sickness or labor 
market history.
Figure 2 shows survival curves by VRP status. We see that youths spend a relatively long 
time in work impairment. After 36 months, 23% of the youth who do not participate in any 
programs is still registered as work impaired. The corresponding shares among program par-
ticipants are 36% for WS, and around 60% for FU, WP, and EDU. The longer durations for 
VRPs partly reflects the lock-in effects of participation.
Figure 3 shows monthly transition rates into different VRPs. Overall, young work-
impaired individuals are more likely to participate in EDU and WP and less likely to partici-
pate in FU measures and WS. We also see that EDU and WP are more frequently used early 
in the work-impairment spell, stabilizing around 10 months, whereas the flow into the other 
programs is rather stable over the 5–6-year period.
Figure 4 shows monthly transition rates into the outcome states work/education and 
social security, by VRP status. For youth who do not participate in any VRP during work 
impairment, the probability of having a transition to work/education decreases rapidly during 
Figure 1  Inflow into work impairment by the month of entry. Young people 18-26 years of 
age in the period 2002–2012. 
Note: The figure includes only youths aged 26 or under, as older youths are not equally rep-
resented over the evaluation period in our data.
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the first 2 years and stabilizes at a low level thereafter. Again, we see indications of lock-in 
effects for the VRPs, with low probabilities and slightly increasing transition rates to work/
education during the first months of the spell. The pattern is quite different when it comes to 
social security, where the likelihood of experiencing a transition to social security drops the 
first year, but we also see a steep increase in the transition rate after around 40 months. This 
partly reflects the dynamic selection problem: individuals who are still work impaired after 
Figure 3  Monthly transition rates into vocational rehabilitation programs (VRPs). Young 
people 18-29 years of age in the period 2002–2012.
Figure 2  Survival curves by vocational rehabilitation program (VRP) status. Young people 
18-29 years of age in the period 2002–2012. 
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40 months constitute a highly selected group with a high probability of entering social security 
and a low probability of entering employment or education.
Descriptive statistics of the observed characteristics of work-impaired youths are pre-
sented in Table 1. Only 46% of work-impairment spells contain VRP participation; the remain-
ing 54% comprise the comparison group. Many young people spend considerable time in work 
impairment, with an average of 20 months for spells of no participation and slightly longer for 
VRP participation spells.9 On an average, youths spend around 8 months in VRPs, with educa-
tional measures lasting the longest.
There are signs of considerable selection into different VRPs. Women participate more 
often in EDU, whereas they are strongly underrepresented among participants in WS. There is 
also a relatively low proportion of non-European youths in WS compared with participants in 
other programs. Participants in EDU tend to be positively selected in that they are more edu-
cated, have more recent labor market experience and also have parents with higher education 
and income. Participants in WP, on the other hand, seem to be negatively selected. Moreover, 
while nearly 44% of participants in EDU receive health-related benefits10 at the start of the 
work-impairment spell, only 25% of participants in WS do.11
There are also notable differences in outcomes states, depending on VRP participation. 
WS and EDU seem to be more successful in terms of outcome states than WP and FU. The 
9 Duration is measured including time spent in VRP.
10 Health-related benefits include all benefits requiring a doctor-certificated medical condition: rehabilitation benefits, 
vocational benefits, time-limited disability benefits (before 2010), and work assessment allowance (after 2010). The first 
month is chosen for practical reasons.
11 We, unfortunately, do not have information about other kinds of transfers the youth receive during work impairment. 
Bragstad and Sørbø (2014) find in their study of young work impaired that 23% of the youth receive social assistance 
during the first month of work impairment, while 32% receive no benefit at all. Their sample is, however, not directly 
comparable to our sample, as they focus only on youth entering work impairment in 2011.
Figure 4  Monthly transition into work/education and social security, by vocational 
 rehabilitation program (VRP) status. Young people 18-29 years of age during the 
 period 2002–2012.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual characteristics
 Age group (years)
   18–20 0.209 0.259 0.330 0.180 0.173
   21–24 0.365 0.375 0.348 0.341 0.388
   25–29 0.426 0.366 0.322 0.479 0.439
 Female 0.481 0.429 0.460 0.501 0.229
 Immigrant 0.067 0.064 0.065 0.072 0.054
 Completed upper secondary education 0.336 0.249 0.216 0.421 0.324
 Activity before entering work impairment
   In education 0.405 0.466 0.496 0.447 0.393
   In employment 0.536 0.431 0.379 0.599 0.596
 Mean income 3 years before entering work impairment
   Labor income, BA 1.485 1.061 0.935 1.767 1.620
   Nontaxable transfers, BA 0.395 0.388 0.403 0.356 0.309
   Taxable transfers, BA 0.248 0.268 0.232 0.241 0.282
 Parental background
   Higher-educated parents 0.221 0.206 0.199 0.257 0.175
   Parents’ labor income, BA 7.723 7.569 7.415 7.992 7.695
   Parents’ transfers, BA 2.303 2.486 2.445 2.169 2.195
 Region of residence
   Eastern Norway 0.496 0.473 0.446 0.499 0.388
   Southern Norway 0.072 0.094 0.081 0.074 0.110
   Western Norway 0.242 0.249 0.234 0.235 0.276
   Middle Norway 0.087 0.100 0.125 0.078 0.115
   Northern Norway 0.103 0.084 0.113 0.113 0.113
   Receiving health-related benefits 0.521 0.373 0.387 0.440 0.255
Spell characteristics
 Duration of work impairment, months 20.524 29.767 27.221 31.275 26.585
 Duration of VRP, months 0.000 8.827 7.909 13.016 8.090
 Transition to work 0.381 0.238 0.185 0.251 0.494
 Transition to education 0.114 0.050 0.059 0.106 0.041
 Transition to permanent disability 0.064 0.053 0.048 0.020 0.018
 Transition to social assistance 0.086 0.038 0.041 0.018 0.026
 Transition to unemployment 0.141 0.070 0.065 0.086 0.124
 Transition to unknown state 0.063 0.036 0.037 0.112 0.047
 Censored due to time 0.151 0.209 0.176 0.026 0.128
 Censored due to transition new VRP 0.000 0.306 0.389 0.327 0.122
Observations 70,590 8,305 23,189 25,512 3,038
VRP, vocational rehabilitation program; BA, basic amounts.
Notes: Column 1 shows means for spells without VR participation, and columns 2–5 show means for spells with VR 
participation. All variables are measured at the start of the work-impairment spell. The income variables are all mea-
sured in BA. In 2018, one BA was equivalent to NOK 96883 (approx. 10,000 euros). Health-related benefits include 
rehabilitation benefits, vocational benefits, time-limited disability benefits (before 2010), and work-assessment 
allowance (after 2010). Taxable transfers include pensions from the National Insurance scheme, occupational pen-
sions, sickness benefits (before 2006), and unemployment benefits, whereas nontaxable transfers include among 
others child benefit, housing benefit, social assistance, and student scholarship.
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differences underscore the importance of modeling transitions to each VRP as well as the out-
comes states separately, with controls for observable individual characteristics and previous 
labor market history. The large observed differences also emphasize the need to control for 
selection on unobserved characteristics as well.
The data do not contain information on medical diagnoses or reasons for work impair-
ment. However, other studies provide a good indication of the types of problems that are most 
prevalent among youths. According to Sutterud (2017), mental health disorders are by far the 
most common diagnosis for recipients of temporary disability benefits; for work-impaired 
young people, social and psychological mental health disorders comprise between 50% and 
60% of the cases of work impairment during the period of analysis (Brage and Bragstad, 2011).
3 Econometric method
The main purpose of active labor market measures is to stimulate and facilitate the employ-
ability of participants. However, it is challenging to identify a causal link between program 
participation and the outcomes. Unobserved factors that affect both the decision to participate 
in measures and the labor market results can give rise to biased estimates of impact effects. Of 
particular concern in the context of VRPs is the health status of the individual, which tends 
to be self-reported or even unobserved. As we do not have access to health information in our 
data, this underlines the importance of controlling for unobserved confounders.
We use the Timing-of-Events (ToE) approach formalized by Abbring and van den Berg 
(2003) to identify the causal effects of VRPs on subsequent transitions. This framework exploits 
information on the timing of events to distinguish causal effects from selection effects. For 
instance, if a VR participant gets a job immediately after exiting the program, it is more likely 
that the participation has affected the job probability than if it takes a long time after VRP 
completion to get a job. In addition, treatment assignment is modeled jointly with the outcome 
of treatment as a competing risk hazard rate. Selection effects are then explicitly controlled for 
by allowing the unobserved determinants associated with each hazard rate to be correlated.
Recent applications of the ToE model include Clausen et al. (2009), Heinesen et al. 
(2013)002C and Kyyrä et al. (2019). Particularly relevant in our context is Holm et al. (2017), 
who use the method to investigate the impact of ALMP for sick-listed workers in Denmark. 
Lombardi et al. (2019) and Gaure et al. (2007) show, using Monte Carlo simulations, that 
the ToE model is well suited for separating causal treatment effects from sorting effects. The 
method has been also shown to perform well relative to other non-experimental methods 
(Muller et al., 2020).
3.1 Empirical specification
Our econometric approach is a multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate model. Time is 
measured from the moment the individual enters work impairment (initial state) and is nor-
malized to zero. We use spells rather than individuals as our analytical unit. Let Tp and To be 
stochastic variables denoting duration until treatment (p = {FU, WP, EDU, WS}) and duration 
until outcome (o = {job/education; social security}), respectively, with realizations tp and to. If t 
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≤ tp, there are two possible transitions: to VRP or one of the outcomes. If t > tp, a  transition to 
VRP has occurred, and the only transition possible is to one of the outcome states. As explained 
above, we only consider the effect of the first VRP of each work-impairment spell.
All durations are measured in months, and thus we use a discrete version of the underly-
ing continuous hazard rate. Let θkit denote the hazard rate from the initial state into state k = p, 
o for spell i during month t:
 
θ α β γpit p it p i p t pid x c v p= + + +( ) =exp ,  FU, WP, EDU, WS
 
θ α β γoit o it o i o t oit oid x c v o= + + + ∆ +( ) =exp ,  job/education, social security
Equation (1) is called the selection equation and models the transition rate from work 
impairment into one of the VRPs. The transition rate from work impairment to one of the out-
comes is explained by Eq. (2), the outcome equation. The effect of spell duration dit is assumed 
to be piecewise constant. Two-month intervals are included for the first 6 months, 4-month 
intervals for durations of 7–18 months, 6-month intervals for durations of 19–36 months, one 
12-month interval for durations of 37–48 months, and an open-ended interval for durations 
over 48 months.
As for observed covariates xi, we include the individual characteristics presented in 
Table 1. All characteristics are measured at the start of the work-impairment spell. In addition, 
to capture national trends and seasonal fluctuations, we include annual and quarterly dum-
mies as well as the local youth unemployment rate in the municipality (ct). All variables are 
included as flexibly as possible, preferably using dummies for each value.
The effect of program participation is defined by the indicator function Δoit, taking the 
value of one if the treatment has been imposed before month t. This treatment effect is further 
divided into two effects: an on-treatment effect and an after-treatment effect. We shall provide 
an interpretation of the program effects in the empirical analysis when presenting the results. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the treatment effect of one particular program is the 
same for all individuals; therefore, Δoit enters the hazard rate model just like the other explana-
tory variables.
3.2 Identification
The timing-of-events results of Abbring and van den Berg (2003) ensure that the abovemen-
tioned model is nonparametrically identified. With single spell data, identification hinges 
strongly on the proportional hazard assumption, which may be a difficult assumption to satisfy 
(see, e.g., van den Berg (2001) for a discussion of the proportionality assumption in a job-search 
setting). However, flexible modeling with a large number of time-varying calendar variables 
introduces exogeneity into the hazard rates and makes the proportionality assumption less 
important while strengthening identification (Brinch, 2007; Gaure et al., 2007; Lombardi 
et al., 2019).
Both the selection and the outcome equation include a set of time-invariant indi-
vidual unobserved characteristics v. The unobserved characteristics enter the model as 
random effects and are thus assumed to be uncorrelated with the observed covariates. This 
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may not hold in our setting. For instance, health is not observable to us and is often consid-
ered to be correlated with parental background and/or educational attainment. However, 
Lombardi et al. (2019) show that the ToE model is relatively robust to correlations between 
observed and unobserved covariates, as long as the distribution of unobserved heterogene-
ity is f lexibly specified, the sample size is large and there is some exogenous variation in 
the hazard rate.
We use the modeling framework described in Gaure et al. (2007); namely, we impose a 
nonparametric probability distribution for v, assuming that the distribution can be character-
ized by an a priori unknown number of discrete points (mass points), with their associated 
probabilities. Further, we assume that v between different transitions may be correlated. For 
instance, motivated individuals are likely to profit more from program participation and are 
more likely to receive job offers as well. If we ignore the correlations between the unobserved 
heterogeneities (e.g., between job and program participation), the estimated treatment effect 
will be biased.
A necessary condition to interpret the treatment effects as causal is the no-anticipation 
assumption. This assumption states that individuals should not have private information 
about the exact timing of treatment ex-ante. Such information may influence their behav-
ior; for instance, they may slow (intensify) their job search activity because they are certain 
that they will participate in a VRP in the future. It may be that program participation is per-
ceived as a threat or punishment, so more effort is put into getting a job before the program 
starts (Maibom Pedersen et al., 2014). If this is the case, the estimated treatment effects will 
be biased. We do not have access to information about notification of VRP participation 
in our data. However, the supply of VRPs is constrained, leading to long waiting times; 
in about a third of cases it took more than a year from the time the user’s ability to work 
was assessed until a program was initiated (Lande and Selnes, 2017). Reasons for the delay 
were many: a program considered to be suitable was not available, or the person was too 
sick or negligence on the part of the public employment services (Lande and Selnes, 2017). 
Furthermore, around half of registered work-impaired individuals lack activity plans, and 
follow-up is sporadic (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). Such findings are indicative that assignment 
to programs is based on availability, often on short notice, and with local variations. Fur-
thermore, the no-anticipation assumption does not rule out the possibility that some indi-
viduals know that they have a larger probability of participating in VRPs and act on this 
knowledge.
3.3 Estimation






























Kit denotes the set of feasible transitions for spell i during month t. Before entering 
treatment, Kit = {p, o}. During and after treatment, Kit = {o}. θkit is the hazard rate defined in 
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Eqs (1) and (2) above. Let ykit be an outcome indicator variable equal to 1 if spell i has a tran-
sition to state k in month t and 0 otherwise, and let Yi denote the complete set of outcome 
indicators for spell i. The conditional likelihood contribution by spell i can then be formu-
lated as  follows:
 
L v p expi i


































The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity vi is approximated in a nonparamet-
ric way by means of a discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). As the unobserved 
heterogeneity terms are unknown by the researcher, they must be integrated from the likeli-
hood function. We follow Gaure et al. (2007) and let the number of mass points be determined 
endogenously in the estimation process together with the other parameters. The estimation 
procedure starts with one mass point (no unobserved heterogeneity), and then more points are 
added until the likelihood can no longer be improved.12 To avoid over- or under-correction for 
unobserved heterogeneity, we use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to select the opti-
mal number of mass points (Lombardi et al., 2019). The sensitivity of our results regarding the 
choice of the information criterion is investigated in Section 4.2.
4 Results
4.1 Lock-in and post-program effects
In this section, we show the main results from the estimated multivariate mixed proportional 
hazard rate model with unobserved heterogeneity outlined above. The preferred model has 
eight mass points in the heterogeneity distribution. The number of mass points is selected 
using the AIC (Lombardi et al., 2019). We start by showing the effect of participating in the 
different VRPs on transitions to job/education and social security.
As mentioned above, the model consists of six transitions that are estimated simultane-
ously: transitions from reduced working capacity to one of the four labor market programs 
and transitions to one of the two outcome states: job/education or social security. The first is 
definitely a measure of success of VRPs. A transition to social security may indicate that the 
program did not have the intended effect—but not necessarily. If participation in a VRP helps 
to realize that the person is incapable of taking up work at all, then a transition to social secu-
rity may be interpreted as a positive outcome.
Table 2 presents the main results.13 Program effects are measured relative to not partici-
pating in any VRPs. By exponentiating the estimated value and subtracting 1, we can interpret 
estimates as percentage changes in the likelihood of a transition occurring over a very short 
time interval (hazard rate), given that no such transition has yet occurred. Thus, the positive 
effect of participating in training with respect to a transition to work/education after the pro-
gram is completed can be interpreted as a percentage increase in the hazard rate of 63.4% ((exp 
(0.491) − 1) * 100). However, when considering effects over larger time spans such as 1 month, it 
12 This is considered to be the case when the log-likelihood increases by <0.01.
13 Complete estimation results are presented in Table A1 and Table A2, both in the Appendix. 
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is necessary to also take into account the level of the transition rate as well as the level of com-
peting transition rates (to other program categories as well as to social security).14
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimates, we have calculated the probability 
that a reference person who has been registered with reduced working capacity for a period of 
6–10 months exits to one of the outcomes states. The reference person is a male native Nor-
wegian, 22–25 years old, who lives in the east of Norway and has only completed compulsory 
school. His parents have low education and average income. The dashed line in Figure 5 (6) 
shows the probability of having a transition to social security (job/education), provided that 
such a transition has not yet occurred, for a reference person who has not participated in any 
program. The bars show how participation in a VRP changes this probability, during participa-
tion in the VRP (left) and after completion of VRP (right), ceteris paribus. The gray bars show 
significant effects, while the white bars show effects that are not significantly different from 
zero.
Figure 5 (left) shows that both EDU and WS are associated with lock-in effects; that is, 
during program participation the likelihood of having a transition to social security is about 
50% lower for a reference participant in training and 45% lower for reference participants in 
WS relative to not participating in any program. However, the likelihood of experiencing a 
transition to social security is very small: slightly over 0.3% for a reference person and nearly 
0.2 for a participant in WS or EDU. 15 After VRP completion, we find small positive effects of 
program participation for FU and WP on the probability of transitions to social security.
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of VRP participation on the transition to job/education. 
Somewhat surprising, as the figure on the left shows, we do not find any lock-in effects related 
to program participation. On the contrary, all programs show positive on-program effects on 
the transition to job/education of roughly between 0.5 and 4% points relative to the nonpartici-
pation alternative. This could reflect that caseworkers more actively use VRPs as a springboard 
to working life than is the case with ordinary ALMP.
14 We have also done a regression where we investigate the impact of the different programs on employment and education 
separately. The estimates behave as expected. The impact on employability is stable for model specification. However, 
when we investigate the effect on education separately we observe that training has a positive significant impact on 
education, and wage subsidies have a negative impact on education. 
15 It is important to note that this is a conditional probability, conditional on not yet having experienced a transition. 
Table 2  Effect of vocational rehabilitation programs (VRPs) during and after program participation on the 
transition to social security and job/education
Transition to social security Transition to job/education
Under VRP After VRP Under VRP After VRP
Follow-up (FU) 0.034 (0.067) 0.237*** (0.074) 0.470*** (0.034) 0.367*** (0.043)
Work practice (WP) −0.061 (0.040) 0.136*** (0.045) 0.251*** (0.024) 0.273*** (0.028)
Training/education (EDU) −0.736*** (0.054) −0.083 (0.057) 0.088*** (0.021) 0.491*** (0.027)
Wage subsidies (WS) −0.598*** (0.117) −0.242 (0.169) 0.691*** (0.043) 0.918*** (0.069)
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. In addition to the treat-
ment effects, the estimations include controls for age, gender, immigrant background, education level, activity 
before work impairment, previous income, parental background, region of residence, indicator for health-related 
benefit receipt, local unemployment rate, duration dependence, and calendar variables. Complete estimation 
results are included in the appendix. The preferred model has eight mass points in the unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution.
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Figure 6  The effect of the vocational rehabilitation program (VRP) on the transition to job/
education. FU, follow-up; WP, work practice; EDU, education/training; WS, Wages 
Subsidies.
Notes: The dashed line shows the transition probability for a reference person who does not 
participate in any VRP, and who has been registered as work impaired for 6–10 months. The 
reference person is a male, aged 22–25, living in Eastern Norway, native-born, with no com-
pleted upper secondary education, with average parental background, by average youth 
unemployment.
Figure 5  The effect of vocational rehabilitation program (VRP) on the transition to social 
security.
Notes: FU, follow-up; WP, work practice; EDU, education/training; WS, wages subsidies. The 
dashed line shows the transition probability for a reference person who did not participate 
in any VRP, and who has been registered as work impaired for 6–10 months. The reference 
person is a male, aged 22–25 years, living in Eastern Norway, native-born, with no com-
pleted upper secondary education, with average parental background, by average youth 
unemployment.
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The figure on the right shows the positive effects of all programs after participation. WS is 
associated with the largest positive effects, in line with most studies of both ordinary ALMPs 
and VRPs, also in an international context. The impact is an increase of about 4% points, 
from 2% to 6%. Meanwhile, EDU shows an increase of nearly 2% points compared with the 
nonparticipation alternative. The likelihood of getting an ordinary job or starting an educa-
tion is nearly three times as high after participation in WS relative to not participating in any 
program. The objective of WS is that participants continue to work for the firm that receives 
the subsidy after the subsidy is removed, which can partly explain the positive effect. However, 
for those participants who return to work impairment after the subsidy period, there is still 
a significantly increased likelihood of a transition to work or education. This indicates that 
the impact of wage subsidies is not exclusively a deadweight effect (i.e., it is not the case that 
employers only hire people they would have employed anyway).16
4.2 Robustness tests
As mentioned earlier, the ToE model makes some assumptions that are difficult to test. In order 
to investigate the sensitivity of our results, we run three robustness tests. The first two concern 
unobserved heterogeneity, while the last test concerns the sample composition.
The ToE model assumes that unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant. However, dur-
ing the spell of work impairment, health may change. If changes in health status influence the 
probability of treatment as well as the probability of having a transition to one of the outcomes, 
our effect estimates may be biased. For instance, youths with deteriorating health statuses may 
be less likely to participate in VRPs because they need to get better in order to benefit from par-
ticipation. At the same time, deteriorating health may be associated with an increased proba-
bility of having a transition to social security and a decreased probability of having a transition 
to job/education. Although our data do not contain any direct information about individual 
health status, we observe whether the youths receive health-related benefits during the spell 
of work impairment. A medical-certified reduced work capacity of at least 50% is required 
in order to be eligible for a health-related benefit. Receipt of a health-related benefit may thus 
serve as a signal of the gravity of the health condition. We include a time-varying indicator 
equal to 1 with the receipt of health-related benefits and 0 otherwise as a proxy to changes in 
health status.17
The second robustness test investigates the sensitivity of our results to the choice of infor-
mation criterion used to select the number of mass points in the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Lombardi et al. (2019) show that selecting too few or too many mass points for 
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity may seriously bias the treatment effects. They 
compare the performance of the Maximum Likelihood (ML) criterion (i.e., choose the number 
of mass points where there is no further improvement in the log likelihood) to information cri-
teria penalizing parameter abundance: the AIC, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and 
16 The literature often argues that WS has greater deadweight and displacement effects than the other types of measures. 
Caliendo et al. (2017) point out that the selection to WS might be more complex than for other programs because it 
involves more active participation on the part of the employed during the hiring. Attempts to fully control for positive 
selection might not be altogether successful. 
17 Holm et al. (2017) conduct a similar robustness test in their evaluation of active labor market programs for sick-listed 
workers in Denmark.
Page 17 of 27  Simon and Hardoy. IZA Journal of Labor Policy (2020) 10:13
Figure 7  Yearly inflow into vocational rehabilitation program (VRP), as share of all ongo-
ing work-impairment spells. Young people 18-29 years of age old.
Note: FU, Follow-up; WP, work practice; EDU, education/training; WS wage subsidies.
the Hannan–Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC) in a ToE framework. They conclude that 
all information criteria perform better than the ML criterion, but no single criterion performs 
better in all settings. They thus recommend using all three criteria and report the results from 
the different criteria as a robustness check. However, they also show that the risk of overcor-
rection is larger in small samples than in large samples, which implies using a less restrictive 
criterion, such as the AIC, in our case.
The last robustness test concerns changes to the composition of our sample related to 
the introduction of the new work-impairment regime in 2009–2010. Importantly, the regime 
introduced obligatory work capability assessments and expanded the target group to include 
individuals without previous labor market or sickness histories. This change is particularly 
relevant for our target group, as young people often lack labor market experience. In addition, 
the regime emphasized intensified follow-up and early activation. As shown in Figure 7, the 
reform led to a steep rise in VRP participation. We investigate whether the implementation of 
the WAA reform affects our results by estimating the model solely on work-impairment spells 
starting before 2009.18
Results from the robustness tests are presented in Table 3. The first column shows results 
from the original model of Table 2, where health is assumed to be time invariant, the number 
of mass points is chosen according to the AIC and the whole sample is used. The next column 
then introduces time-varying health, as explained above. The third and fourth column pres-
ents results using the two other information criteria, whereas the last column shows results for 
spells starting before the work-impairment reform in 2009. As shown in Table 3, the results 
seem to be largely robust to the inclusion of time-varying health. However, some of the positive 
18 Ideally, we would also like to estimate the model on spells starting after 2009. However, the time span is too short for 
many to experience a permanent transition. Hence, a large portion of the observations is censored.
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impacts become more prevalent, and EDU and WS now significantly reduce the likelihood of a 
transition to social security. We also see that the results are robust to the information criterion 
used; both the BIC and the HQIC give very similar results as the original model using the AIC.
When estimating the model using only spells starting before 2009, two interesting differ-
ences appear regarding FU and WP. The results indicate that participants in FU and WP are 
more likely to have a transition to social security while on the program when we disregard the 
period after 2009. This may be associated with the use of VRPs as a screening device. Rules 
are such that activation (work-oriented measures) is compulsory before permanent disability 
benefits can be granted. As the eligibility criteria for receiving health-related benefits became 
less strict after the WAA reform, it is likely that the sample was comprised of relatively more 
youths with serious health conditions before the implementation of WAA than after it. FU and 
WP are more likely than EDU and WS to have been more frequently offered to youth with 
unclear work capability prospects in the period before 2010. The other noticeable change is that 
the positive job/education effect of having participated in WP and FU disappears. This suggests 
that the positive effects of the period after 2009 are driving the positive results in the original 
model. Recall that inflow into VRPs increased dramatically with WAA, with VRP participants 
likely to have better employment prospects since the rules for entitlement became less strict. 
The observed pattern seems to reflect this change in the composition of the target group.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Results from OECD’s Better Life Index show that Norway ranks very high on most measures of 
well-being, with short working hours, low-income inequality and high life satisfaction.19 This 
suggests that workers in Norway should, in principle, enjoy just as good health as workers in 
comparable countries. Nevertheless, Norway has high sickness absence rates and is among the 
countries with the greatest proportion of temporary or permanent health-related benefits.20 
Of particular concern is the large number of youths receiving health-related benefits, of which 
mental disorders are the primary cause. This trend has evolved over the last 30 years despite 
recent reforms and has proven to be difficult to mitigate. While in the early 1990s there were 
twice as many recipients of unemployment benefits as recipients of temporary health-related 
benefits, the relation today is three to one in favor of recipients of temporary health-related 
benefits (Fevang et al., 2017). The most recent figures from Statistics Norway indicate that these 
numbers are continuing to rise.
Public expenditure in Norway on social security benefits amounted to 20% of GDP in 
2018, over a third of which covers health-related benefits. Activation of work-impaired individ-
uals through VRPs is a major goal of the labor market authorities. Despite this, we know little 
about how VRPs function, particularly when it comes to work-impaired youths. There are clear 
indications that youths react differently to activation than adults, and they face quite different 
challenges. Many young people with reduced work capabilities have little or no work experi-
ence. This means that VRPs are highly important as a means to gain the skills and labor mar-
ket experience necessary to improve and facilitate their labor market attachment. Economic 
19 http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/norway.
20 From an international perspective, Norway has very low unemployment rates, and there are indications that some of the 
disability claims may be “unemployment in disguise” (Bratsberg et al., 2013).
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fluctuations clearly affect labor market attachment, more so for young people than for adults 
and disadvantaged youths than for ordinary unemployed (Barth and von Simson, 2012). More-
over, the distinction between unemployment and disability is rather blurry (Røed, 2012). The 
heterogeneity of the target group is further exacerbated by the extra uncertainty related to their 
health, both with respect to the type of diagnosis and the degree of reasonable disability/work 
capability. When it comes to youth, mental health problems are by far the most important fac-
tor related to work impairment, the causes of which can be rather indistinct.
WP is the program with the greatest scope in Norway, both today and in the past 30 years. 
Earlier Norwegian studies suggest that educational and training measures work relatively bet-
ter for people with physical disorders, while those with mental health problems benefit more 
from participating in work-oriented measures (Børing, 2002; Møller, 2005). Markussen and 
Røed (2014) study of work-impaired individuals is in line with the above. They recommend 
early intervention and participation in measures in the ordinary labor market. The exception 
is youths, who seem to benefit more from ordinary education.
We can draw several interesting policy-relevant findings from our analysis. The results 
show that WS, and to some extent EDU, have the intended effect: work-impaired youths 
who participate in these measures have a higher probability of obtaining work or starting an 
education and a lower probability of experiencing a transition to social security than youths 
who do not participate in any measure. For FU and WP, the results are more mixed. During 
participation, these two measures are associated with an increased probability of having a 
transition to work or education and a decreased probability of having a transition to social 
security. After completion of FU or WP, the increased likelihood of getting a job or starting 
an education persists. However, the participants are also more likely to have a transition to 
social security. Recall that activation is a prerequisite for being considered for permanent 
disability benefits. Our results indicate that these measures work primarily as a screening 
device to sort work-impaired individuals into those in need of thorough assistance and 
those in need of a ‘nudge’. The counseling/motivation/mapping on the part of the social 
worker as well as the experience from the program might be motivating factors driving the 
youth to search more actively for an ordinary job. Employers may also use the opportunity 
to sort the people they may eventually want to keep. Hence, push and pull factors may be 
at play, initiated by the youths, the social worker, and/or the employer. For some work-
impaired youths, activation seems to help clarify the need for prolonged rehabilitation or 
work incapacity. For others, it can effectively counteract the moral hazard problem inherent 
in social insurance.
Mental health problems are the most prevalent condition of the work impaired. The 
apparent rise of mental health problems among youth in Norway (Bakken, 2019) can also be 
seen across most OECD countries (OECD, 2018). It is widely documented that mental health 
problems early in life are detrimental for overall well-being, health, and education, both in the 
short and long runs (Collishaw, 2015). For instance, estimates show that the Danish state could 
save ca. 2.8 billion Euros annually (NOK 29.5 billion) if vulnerable children and young people 
are quickly helped back to a normal life course (Rambøll, 2012). School interventions targeted 
at preventing and alleviating mental health problems could spare considerable economic and 
societal resources of youth who are at risk of not completing school and experiencing social 
and economic exclusion.
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Appendix A
Table A1 Complete estimation results: Transitions to vocational rehabilitation programs (VRP)
FU WP EDU WS
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
Completed upper section education −0.048 (0.034) −0.159 (0.022) 0.443 (0.018) 0.142 (0.052)
Receiving health-related benefits −0.576 (0.037) −0.461 (0.023) −0.096 (0.023) −2.273 (0.061)
Non-European immigrant −0.184 (0.062) −0.210 (0.038) 0.293 (0.035) −0.501 (0.110)
Female −0.350 (0.028) −0.168 (0.017) −0.065 (0.016) −1.102 (0.053)
Income last 3 years prior to work impairment
 Nontaxable transfers −0.180 (0.033) −0.059 (0.019) 0.075 (0.018) −0.212 (0.059)
 Taxable transfers 0.095 (0.029) 0.014 (0.019) 0.002 (0.018) 0.232 (0.047)
 Labor income −0.075 (0.015) −0.049 (0.009) 0.143 (0.007) 0.058 (0.020)
Parents’ income average (7–17 years)
 Transfers 0.004 (0.007) −0.027 (0.005) −0.016 (0.004) −0.032 (0.012)
 Labor income −0.004 (0.004) −0.015 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.010 (0.006)
 Higher-educated parents −0.219 (0.036) −0.200 (0.022) 0.098 (0.019) −0.330 (0.060)
 Local youth unemployment rate 0.009 (0.011) 0.022 (0.006) 0.015 (0.006) −0.021 (0.017)
Activity year prior to work impairment
 In education 0.189 (0.032) 0.115 (0.020) 0.273 (0.018) 0.100 (0.053)
 Employed 0.007 (0.037) −0.103 (0.024) 0.133 (0.021) 0.402 (0.059)
Year dummies (2002 reference)
 Year 2003 −0.372 (0.190) −0.431 (0.092) 0.179 (0.067) −0.693 (0.211)
 Year 2004 −0.129 (0.174) −0.194 (0.084) 0.051 (0.066) −0.629 (0.192)
 Year 2005 −0.005 (0.167) −0.359 (0.084) −0.061 (0.066) −0.109 (0.177)
 Year 2006 0.028 (0.166) −0.252 (0.083) −0.105 (0.066) −0.282 (0.178)
 Year 2007 0.259 (0.165) −0.355 (0.085) −0.056 (0.068) −0.197 (0.179)
 Year 2008 0.517 (0.164) −0.126 (0.084) 0.077 (0.067) 0.026 (0.178)
 Year 2009 1.571 (0.158) 1.073 (0.077) 1.063 (0.062) 0.557 (0.174)
 Year 2010 1.625 (0.158) 1.326 (0.076) 0.892 (0.063) −0.208 (0.186)
 Year 2011 1.794 (0.158) 1.464 (0.077) 0.817 (0.063) 0.290 (0.180)
 Year 2012 1.824 (0.159) 1.586 (0.077) 0.738 (0.064) 0.428 (0.180)
 Year 2013 1.916 (0.162) 1.609 (0.080) 0.553 (0.069) 0.656 (0.186)
 Year 2014 2.175 (0.168) 1.690 (0.087) 0.562 (0.078) 0.655 (0.207)
Age category (21–24 reference)
 Age 18–20 −0.177 (0.039) 0.108 (0.024) −0.001 (0.025) −0.273 (0.070)
 Age 25–29 −0.184 (0.034) −0.204 (0.022) −0.033 (0.019) −0.119 (0.053)
Duration of work-impairment spell (1–2 months reference)
 3–4 months −0.062 (0.057) −0.100 (0.031) 0.036 (0.028) 0.277 (0.104)
 5–6 months −0.081 (0.060) −0.145 (0.033) −0.087 (0.030) 0.397 (0.108)
 7–10 months −0.036 (0.053) −0.301 (0.031) −0.148 (0.027) 0.598 (0.096)
 11–14 months −0.038 (0.058) −0.286 (0.033) −0.080 (0.029) 0.773 (0.102)
 15–18 months 0.160 (0.059) −0.273 (0.036) −0.116 (0.032) 0.966 (0.107)
 19–24 months 0.140 (0.059) −0.256 (0.036) −0.149 (0.032) 1.159 (0.106)
 25–30 months 0.262 (0.064) −0.303 (0.040) −0.126 (0.036) 1.261 (0.115)
(Continued)
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FU WP EDU WS
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
 31–36 months 0.278 (0.070) −0.290 (0.045) −0.167 (0.040) 1.413 (0.123)
 37–48 months 0.221 (0.070) −0.340 (0.045) −0.226 (0.041) 1.640 (0.123)
 49+ months 0.219 2 (0.083) −0.339 (0.054) −0.350 (0.051) 1.776 (0.140)
Quarter (first-quarter reference)
 Quarter 2 0.004 (0.036) 0.045 (0.022) 0.443 (0.024) 0.070 (0.062)
 Quarter 3 0.114 (0.036) 0.210 (0.022) 0.954 (0.021) 0.265 (0.060)
 Quarter 4 0.327 (0.036) 0.289 (0.022) 0.339 (0.024) 0.295 (0.061)
Region of residence (Eastern Norway reference)
 Southern Norway 0.244 (0.048) 0.191 (0.032) −0.013 (0.030) 0.570 (0.076)
 Western Norway 0.081 (0.035) 0.085 (0.022) 0.035 (0.019) 0.273 (0.055)
 Middle Norway −0.012 (0.048) 0.382 (0.028) −0.158 (0.029) 0.363 (0.074)
 Northern Norway −0.202 (0.050) 0.181 (0.028) 0.161 (0.026) 0.241 (0.075)
FU, follow–up; WP, work practice; EDU, education/training; WS, wage subsidies.
Table A1 Continued
Table A2 Complete estimation results: Transitions to outcome states
Social security Job/education
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Completed upper secondary education −0.398 (0.027) 0.350 (0.012)
Receiving health-related benefits −1.088 (0.024) −1.438 (0.013)
Non-European immigrant −0.114 (0.040) 0.121 (0.023)
Female −0.391 (0.020) 0.050 (0.011)
Income last 3 years prior to work impairment 0.392 (0.019) −0.120 (0.013)
Nontaxable transfers
 Taxable transfers 0.040 (0.019) 0.027 (0.012)
 Labor income −0.109 (0.011) 0.118 (0.005)
Parents’ income average, 7–17 years
 Transfers 0.025 (0.005) −0.010 (0.003)
 Labor income 0.001 (0.003) 0.006 (0.001)
 Higher educated parents −0.037 (0.026) −0.001 (0.013)
 Local youth unemployment rate 0.000 (0.007) −0.020 (0.004)
Activity year prior to work impairment
 In education −0.231 (0.022) 0.133 (0.012)
 Employed −0.232 (0.027) 0.428 (0.014)
Year dummies (2002 reference)
 Year 2003 0.081 (0.076) −0.114 (0.040)
 Year 2004 0.130 (0.074) 0.001 (0.038)
 Year 2005 0.159 (0.072) 0.166 (0.037)
 Year 2006 0.050 (0.071) 0.244 (0.037)
(Continued)
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Social security Job/education
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
 Year 2007 −0.150 (0.074) 0.270 (0.038)
 Year 2008 −0.611 (0.077) 0.038 (0.038)
 Year 2009 −0.861 (0.077) −0.109 (0.037)
 Year 2010 −0.585 (0.073) −0.596 (0.038)
 Year 2011 −0.325 (0.073) −0.384 (0.038)
 Year 2012 −0.480 (0.074) −0.379 (0.039)
 Year 2013 −0.559 (0.077) −0.347 (0.041)
 Year 2014 −0.046 (0.079) −0.331 (0.045)
Age (21–24 reference)
 Age 18–20 years 0.152 (0.027) 0.035 (0.016)
 Age 25–29 years 0.006 (0.024) −0.178 (0.013)
Duration of work-impairment spell (1–2 months reference)
 3–4 months −0.008 (0.038) 0.077 (0.019)
 5–6 months −0.034 (0.041) 0.045 (0.020)
 7–10 months −0.065 (0.037) 0.006 (0.019)
 11–14 months −0.065 (0.039) −0.006 (0.021)
 15–18 months −0.043 (0.042) −0.093 (0.023)
 19–24 months 0.032 (0.041) −0.070 (0.023)
 25–30 months 0.118 (0.044) −0.033 (0.025)
 31–36 months 0.206 (0.048) −0.020 (0.028)
 37–48 months 0.567 (0.044) 0.171 (0.027)
 49+ months 1.138 (0.048) 0.300 (0.032)
Quarter (first quarter reference)
 Quarter 2 −0.024 (0.025) 0.124 (0.013)
 Quarter 3 0.107 (0.024) 0.415 (0.012)
 Quarter 4 0.040 (0.025) −0.031 (0.014)
Region of residence (Eastern Norway reference)
 Southern Norway 0.042 (0.035) −0.048 (0.020)
 Western Norway 0.062 (0.024) −0.025 (0.013)
 Middle Norway −0.017 (0.033) −0.051 (0.018)
 Northern Norway −0.114 (0.033) 0.023 (0.017)
Table A2 Continued
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Appendix B
Vocational rehabilitation programs:
i) Education/Training (EDU): qualifying formal training in a classroom both in the form 
of shorter labor market training courses (normally up to 10 months) or in the ordinary 
education system (maximum 3 years).
ii) Wage subsidies (WS): subsidy to employer to hire persons who encounter difficulties in 
acquiring a job on an ordinary basis. Wage subsidies exist for firms both in the private 
and public sectors, and the participant is supposed to perform regular tasks. The maxi-
mum duration is 1 year, but it can be extended to up to 3 years.
iii) Work practice (WP): mostly on-the-job training expected to provide work experience. 
The duration is normally 1 year, but it can be extended to 2 years. Work practice is 
offered both in the ordinary and sheltered sectors.
iv) Follow-up (FU): supported employment and follow-up assistance with the goal of 
obtaining or retaining work. The duration is up to 6 months, but it may be extended 
for another 6 months and for special needs for up to 3 years. It also includes job search 
courses and assistance at work.
Outcomes states
If a person is registered in multiple states at the same time, the following order of priorities 
apply:
1) Disability insurance: persons registered with permanent disability insurance.
2) Job: persons registered with a working relationship in the employment registers or 
registered as partially employed in the Employers Register. We also include persons 
receiving parental benefits or sick pay, as these states require an on-going employment 
relationship. Wage income in the job relationship is required to be above 5,000 NOK 
(approx. 650 EUR). If we do not observe a job relationship in the employment register, 
we use the income register to investigate whether the person has had wage income and 
if it is reasonable to believe that the person might have had a job after leaving work 
impairment. We divide annual income by the months left in the year after leaving work 
impairment. If the figure is higher than 5,000 NOK, we define it as a job transition.
3) Education: persons registered with current education in the National Education Data-
base.
4) Unemployed: persons registered as unemployed in the unemployment register, regard-
less of receipt of unemployment allowance.
5) Social assistance: persons registered as recipients of social assistance.
6) Unknown: persons not found in any of the above states.
